A. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the Shrimp rulings in Chapter 6 concludes that unilateral environmental trade measures can be justified under Article XX in a manner that is consistent with the jurisdictional competence of states and international environmental law. Chapter 7 concluded that, if MEA measures are taken against non-parties, the treatment will be the same as for unilateral measures and the outcome of a WTO challenge will be determined in accordance with the Shrimp decisions. This chapter shows how the authorization of unilateral trade measures under GATT Article XX creates a problem of unequal access to the rights provided by that provision, due to the effect that market power has on access to the right.
The effectiveness of unilateral trade measures depends on the relative market power of the importing and exporting countries. Thus, in practice, this mechanism is only available to WTO members with substantial markets-large developed and developing countries. While, in theory, this mechanism is available to all WTO members, the least-developed countries and small developing countries will not be able to use it to great effect. Thus, rights that are unavailable to developing and least-developed countries may be inconsistent with WTO provisions and decisions that require differential treatment of developing and least-developed countries that favours these categories of member.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the extent to which unilateral measures may be effective in resolving the problem of free riders in international environmental protection. It then demonstrates that the effectiveness of unilateral measures depends on market power. This is followed by an analysis of special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries in WTO law that develops an interdisciplinary framework for analyzing SDT provisions and policies. This chapter then considers the analogous situation of the use of countermeasures under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), where the effective use of trade measures to enforce dispute settlement rulings is also complicated by variations in the market power ofWTO members.
B. THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM
In essence, the ruling in Shrimp 21.5 represents an attempt to resolve a "free rider" problem. In the context of international environmental negotiations, each country has an incentive to "free ride" on the other countries' efforts to protect the environmental resource at stake. In the Shrimp 21.5 case, Malaysia's refusal to participate in the sea turtle protection program can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the cost of protecting the turtles and thus to free ride on the efforts of the other countries. As long as the other countries' participation achieves the goal of saving the turtle, Malaysia has no incentive to participate. By not participating, the free rider gets the benefit of the resource without paying the cost of maintaining the resource.
The Kyoto Protocol provides another example. Assuming that greenhouse gas emissions provoke climate change that harms all countries, the reduction of emissions produces a benefit for all. However, there is an economic cost to reducing emissions. If one country (the free rider) refuses to pay the cost of participating while the other countries agree to pay the cost of reducing emissions, the free rider gains the benefit of reduced emissions without paying for the benefit. However, if the free rider is penalized for refusing to participate and the cost of the penalty exceeds the cost of participation, the free rider now has an incentive to participate in conserving the common resource.
The Shrimp 21.5 ruling resolves the free rider problem by allowing the use of trade barriers to penalize the free rider and thus to create an incentive for the free rider to participate in a multilateral environmental agreement. In this case, the penalty is the denial of
